LAW NOTES

THE DARK AGES
REVISITED?
n November4, 1992, the
Supreme Court of the
United States heard oral arguments on the issue of whether
sacrificing animals in religious
ceremonies is protected by the
Constitution's guarantee of
free exercise of religion (see
the Fall 1992 HSUS News).
The HSUS and four other
national animal-protection organizations, in a brief filed
with the Court, argued that
state and local governments
should be constitutionally able
to outlaw the killing of animals
for religious purposes. American society, of course, each
year lawfully uses- and killsmillions of animals for food,
clothing, biomedical research,
protection of people and property, and sport. Why, in such a
context, should animals not be
killed in the name of religion?
The answer lies both in the
substantial changes in the
moral and legal culture of this
country since the founding of
the organized humane movement in the last century and in
the underlying reasons for protecting religious freedom in
the first place.
Prior to the passage of New
York State's anticruelty statute
in 1867, animals anywhere
could be killed or abused with
impunity for any reason or for
no reason at all. Over the succeeding forty years, the humane movement engineered
he adoption of anticruelty
starutes. most of which were
od led on the "\few York law,
:.;-; :ill s:.a ~sand through public
·
d general ac;;u stanrial
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Animal sacrifice is a relic of another time, place, and prevailing
morality. In Florida two bound sheep await their death in the
backyard of a practitioner of Santeria.

changes in the moral and legal
climate of the country. The unnecessary killing of animals
was, by and large, outlawed
(although law enforcement
was, and remains, imperfect).
Courts not only affirmed the
constitutionality of the anticruelty statutes but also recognized them as hallmarks of
progress and of a shift in public standards of behavior toward nonhuman life. More
specialized statutes striking at
customs and practices once
considered reputable, such as
animal-fighting events, followed. A battery of federal
protective statutes complemented state law. The result,
over the course of a century,
was a steadily enhanced protection afforded to animals and
a concomitant narrowing of
the acceptable justifications
for killing or exploiting animals Gustifications that were
grounded in tangible, objectiYely established human needs

such as food, clothing, and
preservation of public health
and safety, or in the prevention
of suffering in animals themselves). Even sport hunting is
now commonly justified, albeit speciously, as a food-gathering activity or as a humane
measure to prevent crowding,
disease, and malnutrition in
wild-animal populations.
Permitting the killing of animals to satisfy subjective religious beliefs-a purported justification disconnected from
both a standard of necessity, in
the sense of tangible, objective
human needs, and from humane considerations- would
be, then, a giant step backward
to the time when animals
could be abused at the whim of
their immediate custodians
without legal consequences.
Like human sacrifice, animal
sacrifice is a relic of another
time, place, and prevailing
public morality.
Moreover,
extinguishing

life in the name of religion
undermines one of the purposes behind the free-exercise-ofreligion clause itself. Religions are given special status
under the Constitution: first,
for pragmatic reasons- to avoid
the sectarian warfare and civil
unrest that Europe experienced
for generations; and second,
because religions are supposed
to nurture conscience and
keep it active. As the courts of
the last century recognized,
the refinement of conscience
through the expansion of human sympathies toward nonhuman life for the general social benefit was the moral idea
underlying the anticruelty
Jaws, the notion that cruelty
and unnecessary killing of animals deadens conscience toward all forms of life, including people, being readily accepted at that time.
Animal sacrifice is a practice that atrophies conscience.
It is a practice based on the extremely dangerous outlook
that ideology is more important than life. It ignores the
link between permitting violence toward animals and engendering violence toward human beings, a link being confirmed by modern sociological
research.
While religious beliefs are
legally untouchable in the
country, and properly so, The
HSUS believes that nothing in
the First Amendment requires
protection of religious practices steeped in a fundamental
•
disrespect for life.
The Law Notes are HTitten by
HSUS General Counsel Roger
Kindler and Senior Counsel
Murdaugh Stua rt Madden.
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